This paper examines the theory, originally developed by Helpman (1984) , that underlies Choi and Krishna's (2004) 
Introduction
In a recent paper Choi and Prishna (2004) claim to provide a significant advancement in testing the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade. The authors provide empirical support for a prediction on the bilateral factor content of trade, originally developed by Helpman (1984) . Helpman's predictions have the attractive features of relying on 'post-trade' factor price comparisons and claim to hold under nonequalization of factor prices and in the absence of any assumptions regarding consumer preferences. However, these features seem at odd with the messages from the pioneering general equilibrium trade literature from the 1950s, in particular the seminal work of Lionel McKenzie (1954 McKenzie ( , 1955 . Introducing activity analysis as a tool to analyze international specialization in what is now known as the "multi-cone Heckscher-Ohlin framework", McKenzie (1954, p. 180) has stressed that "…it is not possible through merely bilateral comparison to develop a…theory of efficient multilateral specialization". In addition, McKenzie (1955) has brought to light the central role of factor price equalization in a general equilibrium trading system and has stressed that (McKenzie, 1955, p. 245 ) "in the set of goods price vectors which do not permit equalization of factor prices no assured statement about specialization can be made without stronger assumptions [on production and preferences]".
The purpose of this paper is to reconcile these conflicting views on the neoclassical trade model. I show that, contrary to current belief, Helpman's bilateral prediction is not a result of the concavity property of the neoclassical trade model; in contrary, it is at odds with it. 3 The main result of the paper shows that Helpman's bilateral prediction will be compatible with the concavity property of the neoclassical trade model only if there is either factor price equalization or no trade.
The development of the arguments is organized as follows: section 2 sets-up the theoretical framework. Section 3 revisits Helpman's proof and shows that his 'thought experiment' leads to a multitude of predictions on bilateral and multilateral trade flows. Section 4 revisits Choi and Krishna's (2004) empirical implementation and illustrates the difficulty of interpreting the thousands of predictions implied by
Helpman's 'thought experiment'. Section 5 shows that the 'thought experiment' is at odds with the concavity property of the revenue function. Section 6 derives theoretically unique shadow price restrictions on the bilateral factor content of trade and shows that they will coincide with Helpman's restriction only if there is either factor price equalization or no trade. Section 7 concludes with a discussion on the informational role of prices.
Theoretical background
Helpman's theoretical prediction builds on Deardorff (1979) and Brecher and Choudhri (1982) . The central theme in these papers is to provide predictions in the spirit of Heckscher-Ohlin, but in the absence of factor price equalization. All three papers investigate the property of a competitive free trade equilibrium with two key characteristics. First, all countries possess identical production functions. Second, countries' factor endowments are assumed to be sufficiently dissimilar so that countries' free trade factor prices are different.
Formally, consider a competitive equilibrium with m countries, n goods, l factors and a common technology matrix, A(.)=<a ντ (.)>, where a ντ are the units of factor ν necessary to produce 1 unit of good τ. Although identical technologies imply the same functional forms for a ντ , the equilibrium least-cost input coefficients will depend on country specific factor prices.
If T ij denotes the vector of gross imports of country j from country i, F ij denotes the factor content of T ij evaluated at the exporter's input techniques, i.e.
, where w i is the free-trade factor price vector of the exporting country i.
For two countries, i and j, who are engaged in bilateral trade, Helpman derives the following prediction on the net bilateral factor content of trade:
Inequality (1) Countries are ranked according to their relative factor endowments:
Since countries' factor endowments are assumed to be in different cones of diversification, the three countries will specialize in the production of different goods.
The most capital-abundant country 1 will produce the most capital-intensive goods 1 and 2; country 2 will produce goods 3 and 4 and the least capital-abundant country 3 will produce the least capital-intensive goods 5 and 6. The intuition for (1) stems from the implicit assumption that there is a one-to-one correspondence between this factor endowment ranking and the ranking of free trade equilibrium factor price ratios ω
In any pair-wise comparison, the more capital-abundant country will also have the higher equilibrium wage-rental ratio. In reference to Figure 1 , Helpman (1984, p. 90) Brecher and Choudhri's (1982) prediction can be written algebraically as:
If Helpman's prediction in (1) were a true generalization of (2) 
The predictions (2) and (3) are quite different. Inequality (2) provides sign predictions on individual factors based on country-specific differences in relative factor prices. In contrast, inequality (3) makes a sign prediction on the entire net factor content of
however, does not appear to have a meaningful economic interpretation. It pertains to a weighted average of the net factor content of trade with the weights being the difference in absolute factor prices. But we know that it is the difference in relative not absolute factor prices that determines the pattern of international specialization in neoclassical trade theory.
Revisiting Helpman (1984): Additional predictions
Helpman arrives at (1) through two steps: (i) a 'thought experiment' on a factor endowment gift and (ii) the concavity property of GDP function. 4 In a free trade equilibrium a country's GDP can be written as G(p,V j )= p′ Y j =w j ′ V j , where V j denotes the country's endowment vector, Y j its production vector and p the free trade equilibrium goods price vector. Helpman derives then the following relationships:
The second inequality (5) is a direct implicaton of the concavity of the GDP function with respect to factor endowments. Helpman's justification for inequality (4) between the factor content of bilateral exports and the bilateral difference in factor prices:
Applying the same logic to the factor content of exports from country j to i, F ji , one
Inequality (1) results then from adding (6) and (7). For m countries, Helpman's logic implies a total of m(m-1)/2 bilateral predictions.
However, a closer look at Helpman's thought experiment, captured in inequality (4), is that the underlying logic is not specific to F ij . It can be applied to any endowment gift for country j associated with the gross trade flow of country i to any third country or, in fact, any subgroup of trading partners. To keep the notation simple, let k index a destination. If T ik denotes the gross trade flow from country i to destination k, where k pertains either to just a single country or any subgroup of countries, the factor content of trade is then defined as F ik = A(w i )T ik . Applying the thought experiment logic to the endowment gift F ik , we obtain the following inequality:
for all i, j and k
Applying the concavity property to V j +F ik , we obtain:
Combining (8) and (9) with the zero-profit condition, p′ T ik =w i ′ F ik , we obtain:
Inequality (10) 
It is difficult to provide a meaningful interpretation of (11) since it implies that each bilateral factor price difference between countries k and i, (w k -w i ), provides a prediction on the factor content of exports from country i to country j.
Revisiting Choi and Krishna
Choi and Krishna (2004) 
It can be easily seen that (1) is a special case of (12) However, as mentioned above, bilateral factor-price differences restrict not only bilateral but also multi-lateral trade flows. Alternatively, we can ask ourselves how many factor flows are restricted by a given factor-price difference vector (w j -w i ).
Applying (10) to a destination index ĸ which identifies a subset of trading partners, one obtains:
For a fixed j and i, (13) implies that (w j -w i ) restricts 127 different gross exports of country i. 6 Varying j and i across the sample yields a total of 7112 (=8x7x127) predictions! To illustrate the nature of the predictions, assume i=US and j=Germany.
Inequality (13) implies that the factor price difference betweeen Germany and the US, Germany appears to make sense, the other 126 predictions lack any economic intuition. This already suggests that there must be some flaw with the underlying logic.
Revisiting Helpman's thought experiment
The predictions are derived from combining Helpman's thought experiment (TE) with the concavity property of the GDP function. The reason why one obtains so many predictions is that the thought experiment has more to do with the factor content of production than with bilateral trade flows. Specifically, the thought experiment involves a comparison between two gifts: a revenue gift of the 'money value' of the trading partner's production, valued at the trading partner's factor prices, and the 'physical gift' of the factor content of production. Helpman's conjecture is that the latter gift is more preferable than the former, expressed by the following inequality:
where S i denotes the factor content of production, which is necessarily a subvector of with (8) and we obtain thousands of additional gift comparisons. The assumption that (TE) will always hold independent of the underlying preference structures is simply too strong. In fact, one can use the concavity property of the GDP function to show that (TE) can be violated for some S i . This is accomplished in proposition 1. q.e.d.
Proposition 1 can be illustrated in Figure 2 . Strict concavity implies that for a given endowment vector V j , there will be a unique factor price w j that characterizes the tangent to G(p,V) at V j . Now choose a factor price vector w i that corresponds to a steeper slope. From Figure 2 , we can see that G(p,V j )+w i S * will be larger than G(p,V j +S * ) for any S * >0. In higher dimensions, the geometry is a more complicated and (TE) is not expected to be violated for every vector S * . However, the graph illustrates that (TE) is at odds with the concavity property of the GDP function.
Because of diminishing returns, a social planner might prefer the money gift over the endowment gift. First we should notice that the shape of a country's GDP function in a trading equilibrium depends on the factor price equalization assumption. If factor prices are equalized, the GDP function is linear in endowment changes, as illustrated in Figure   3 . If w f denotes the common equilibrium factor price, (TE) will be satisfied as an
, and (1) will always hold.
However, in the absence of factor price equalization, we can derive non-trivial restrictions on the bilateral factor content of trade. In order to derive analytical results, we need to make a few assumptions about the representative GDP function in a trading equilibrium. The implication of this assumption is captured in the following lemma.
Lemma: For each endowment vector V k , there will be a unique equilibrium shadow
Assumption 2: The equilibrium goods price vector p * is assumed to be fixed.
Although heroic, assumption 2 is essential for exploiting the concavity property of the GDP function. It guarantees that reallocating factor endowments does not lead to any 'shifts' in the GDP function. 
Inequalities (14) and (15) are illustrated in Figure 4 . Inequality (14) is a replication of (5) and captures the fact that the tangent at w j will lie above the GDP function.
Inequality (15) 
Figure 4: Shadow price restrictions
Adding (14) and (15), we obtain
The factor content of bilateral gross imports of country j by country i is restricted by the difference between the importing countries actual factor price vector w j and the shadow price j ŵ under the endowment V j +F ij . Similarly, F ji is restricted by 
Since the shadow prices depend on the endowments of countries i and j, inequality (18) Proposition 2 is at the heart of this paper. It states that Helpman's prediction will be compatible with the concavity property of the GDP function if either there is no trade or the trading equilibrium is characterized by factor price equalization. As a result
Choi and Krishna's empirical support of (1) can be interpreted as an indication of factor price equalization, but not as evidence of international specialization in the spirit of Heckscher-Ohlin.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I provide an informational argument why (1) does not constitute a prediction about the direction of international trade. The argument is rooted in Hayek's (1945) fundamental insight that in a market economy goods prices contain all the relevant information about underlying fundamentals. In the theoretical trade literature, the most general statements about the direction of international specialization are based on autarky prices. The reason for this is that an economy's autarky prices contain all the relevant information about the country's fundamentals (e.g. preferences, technologies or tastes) in the absence of international specialization.
This information is used to evaluate, or restrict, an economy's vector of international specialization with its trading partners. If the focus is on commodity trade, the theory of comparative advantage implies that the commodity autarky price vector p a restricts the economy's net commodity import vector T, predicting that p a T>0 (Deardorff, 1980 (Deardorff, 1982) . In both cases, information from outside the trading regime (i.e. autarky) is used to predict the direction of international specialization in a trading regime.
In contrast, (1) is based on free trade factor price differences between two trading partners. Since free trade factor prices embody information about a regime where international specialization has already taken place, they do not provide enough information about country-specific fundamentals to predict which trading pattern should or should not occur in such a regime. In the absence of autarky price information, predicting the factor content of multilateral trade requires the strong assumption that all countries have the same homothetic preference structures (Vanek, 1968) . Obtaining a prediction on the direction of the factor content of bilateral trade is expected to require assumptions that are too restrictive to be empirically meaningful.
